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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
L. LYNN ALLEN _and MERLE
ALLEN,
Plaintiffs/
Respondents,
vs.
THOMAS M. KINGDON and
JOAN 0. KINDGON,

Case No.

18290

Defendants/
Appellants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff to have earnest
Money and other monies paid persuant to a Sale Agreement of
residential real estate.

There was also a Counterclaim.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The honorable Jay E. Banks tried this case without
a Jury on March 5, 1981, and found that the earnest Money
agreement had been entered into but it had been rescinded or
modified by the parties in many respects.
$1,000.00 was paid as earnest money and $9,800.00

was paid as additional down payment on a conditional payment
check.

Judge Banks found thatthe earnest money and additiona l

f.
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down payment were to· be refunded to

Buyers, but

th~the

Buyers (Plaintiffs) had wrongfully filed a mechanics lien
and that Defendants were entitled to $1,000.00 in punitive
damages.

The $1,000.00 Judgment was offset against the

$10,800.00 Plaintiffs Judgment resulting in a net Judgment
for the Plaintiffs of $9,800.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiffs/Respondents seek that the Supreme
Court uphold the judgement of the Lower Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiffs/buyers entered into an agreement with
the Defendants to purchase a home owned by the Defendants on
or about February 12, 1978.

This agreement was written and

admitted as exhibit Pl5 into the Trial.
The document was signed by both Plaintiffs and both
Defendants.
At the time when the additional $10,000.00 was due
the parties started negotiating

be~ause

the Defendants wanted

to keep a light fixture, which was agreed, and the $200.00
deduction was made from the $10,000.00 due and so the buyers
only paid the sellers an additional

$9,800.00.

The buyers

requested that the sellers repair the patio, but the sellers
refused.

The buyers requested that the sellers paint the front

of the home,
this.

the court found that the sellers agreed to do

The sellers later requested that the date of possession
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be extended until their new home was finished.
buyers agreed to that extension.

The

The buyers later

requested that the sellers pay rent for the extension,
but the sellers refused to pay rent unless the buyers
would close the transaction and the sellers could get
paid.
The sellers failed to paint the front of their
home and when the day for closing came the buyers refused
to pay tne full amount of earnest money but insisted on
a $500.00 deduction because of the failure to paint.
Because of this claim the matter never closed, and
Mrs. Allen left the closing discussion without saying
anything.
not

ref~nd

Mrs. Kingdon left and said the Kingdons would
the earnest money.

The court found that after

the wives had left Mr. Kingdon said that he would refund
the earnest money to the buyers.
Later the sellers had their attorney send a letter
to the Plaintiff demanding the closing of the transaction
which was refused.

The sellers later moved out of their

home into their new home and never rented the home.
court found that they failed to mitigate
by trying to

ren~

The

their damages

it, and that whatever the value of the

home the court found that the sellers still had the home.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE GREATER WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY PROVIDES
THAT A WRITTEN CONTRACT WITHIN THE STATUTE
OF F~.llDS MAY BE RESCINDED ORALLY.
Although there are a minority of cases to the contrary, the law regarding oral rescission is well stated
as follows:
It has been held in some of the earlier
cases that an agreement to rescind is as
much an agreement concerning land as the
original contract, and hence should be in
- writing; but all the later cases, both in
England and the United States, are unanimous in holding that a contract in writing
and by law required to be in writing, may
in equity be rescinded by parol, and this,
eventhough the contract may have been
under seal. Such rescission may be effected
not only be express agreement, but by any
course of conduct clearly indicating a
mutual assent to the termination or abandonment of the contract.
2 Warville on
Vendors § 826 (2d ed.).
This

statement

was cited as definitive of the law

in Utah under Cutright v. Union Savings & Investment Co.,
33 Utah 486, 94 P. 984 (1908)

In that case, one Jenkins

purchased, persuant to a real estate contract, real
property from the Defendant.

Jenkins fell behind in

payment and, when the defendant tried to collect,
r~turned

the key to the property and indicated his un-

willingness to bring payments current and
posession.

r~main

in

Jenkins assignee sued, claiming that the

rescission was invalid, arguing that any modification or
rescission of a contract under the Statute of Frauds must
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also be in writing and not merely oral.

The trial court

ruled against the Plaintiff, and the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed.
In the present case, the lower court has held thatan
oral .rescission. of an earnest money agreement for the
purchase of land is valid.

This decision is supported

by Utah case law and in addition represents the greater
weight of authority in all jurisdictions. 4 S. WILLISTON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 592

(~

ed. 1961)

and 28 Rocky Mtn L. Rev. 269 (1956)
There is no Utah case law exactly on point.

However,

other jurisdictions provide excellent support for the
decision of the lower court.

A case precisely on point

was decided by the Supreme Court of Colorado based on a
Statute of Fraud essenti.ally

identical to the control-

ling Utah Statute.
The Colorado statute read:
No estate or interest in lands, other
than leases for a term not exceeding one
year, nor any trust or power over or
concerning lands, or in any manner relating
thereto, shall hereafter be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared,
unless by act or operation of law, or by
deed or conveyance in writing, subscribed
by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by
his lawful agent, thereunto authorized by
writing. C.S.A. chapter 71 §6 (1935).
The Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1953) varies little in
wording and is

identical in

meaning~
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No estate or interest in real property, other than
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any
trust or power over or concerning real property
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created,
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared other
wise than by act or operation of law, or by deed
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. Utah Code Ann §25-5-1 (1953).
Niernburg v. Feld,131 Colo 508, 283 P.2d 640 (1955)
is fact specific to the case at bar.

Defendants/Sellers

(Husband and Wife) entered into a sales agreement with
the Plaintiffs/Buyers (Husband and Wife) for the sale
of certain real estate owned jointly by Defendants.

The

Buyers paid a deposit agreeing to pay the balance upon
closing.

The contract included a liquidated damages

clause requiring the forfeiture of deposit on failµre
to pay the balance.

Prior to closing the buyers advised

the sellers they "couldn't go through with the deal."

At

a conference with only the husbands present, just prior
to, closing, there was an oral agreement to mutually
rescind the contract.

At that time the seller made an

oral promise to refund buyers deposit upon certain terms
which were shortly fulfilled.

Subsequently seller re-

fused to refund as promised and buyer brought an action
to recover his deposit.

From a lower court judgment

in favor of the buyer, seller appealed alleg~ng

error

in three areas similar to those.presented by the seller
in the present case.

They were:

1. An attempted executory rescission
or modification of a prior written
agreement is invalid as being in vio ..
lation of the Statute of Frauds.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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2. That a subsequent oral promise was
without consideration and therefore
void, because no benefit was conferred or detriment suffered.
3. ·The oral promise of defendant
Phillip Niernberg given to Plaintiffs
did not constitute a rescission of
the written agreement, because one of
the parties to the written agreement
was not a party to the subsequent
oral agree~ent and one joint obliger
could not agree to a rescission without the consent of the other obliger.
Niernberg, 283 P.2d at 640.
In opposing all three allegations and affirming the
decision of the lower court the Colorado Supreme Court
held respectively:

First,

It seems to be the better - reasoned rule
that an executory contract involving
title to, or an interest in, lands may be
rescinded by agreement resting in parol.
The Statute of Frauds concerns the making
of contract only, and does not apply to
the matter of their revocation. The
requirement for the making of a contract
is one thing and the revocation or rescission thereof is another, and we are satisfied to announce as the law in this
jurisdiction that such executory contracts
may be rescinded by the mutual consent of
parties thereto.
Id at 642.
Second, regarding the promise to repay the deposit by
the seller:
As to the question of lack 9f consideration, we find that in the instant case
there was a promise for a promise involving
the release of each party from further performance, and this mutual consideration is
sufficient to support the agreement.
Id
at 642.
Third, regarding the absense of the sellers wife:
Neither is he in position to successfully
contend as a reason for escape, that he is

-9-
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not liable because his wife was not a party
to the rescission.
If he assumed to act
in her absence and she is dismissed from
the case, he should be bound by his own
actions and declaration.
Id at 642.
The decision of the lower court in the case at bar
complies almost exactly with the_ Niernberg decision
and represents the weight of authority.
The honorable Judge Banks, after hearing all the
evidence, determined that the earnest money agreement
was rescinded at closing

(R-134).

In addition each

husband was the effective and the apparent agent of
their respective wives to rescind the contract.

(R-133),

These findings were correctly made and represent the
law in this jurisdiction.

A respected treatise on the

law of contracts properly states "The Statute of Frauds
does not mention contracts for rescission or discharge
and such contracts are, therefore, not affected by its
terms."

4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

CONTRACTS § 592 (3d ed. 1961).

POINT 2
A FORFEITURE OF BUYERS DEPOSIT WOULD BE PUNITIVE IN
NATURE AND WAS PROPERLY REFUSED ENFORCEMENT BY THE
LOWER COURT.
The seller promised, at the time of rescission to
refund buyers deposit.
f o 11 m.;i n g in i ts f i

ar:d

r~rs.

e~r:.cst

The lower court cited the

I l di 11 g

Kinadon left,
r.or;c-y to the

of fact :

~1r.

" After Mrs . A11 en

Kingdon agreed to refund the

Pldinliffs."

-10-

(R-133)
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The record correctly states that " The bank officer;
the only disinterested witness who testified, stated that
Mr. Kingdon said that the deal was off and that Mr. Allen
could have his money back.

Also, that the money was in

the bank, and that he would pay it the next day."

(R-108)

Based on this testimony and the evidence as a
whole the lower court determined that such a promise
had been made by the Seller.

The defendant/seller, has

failed to present the required preponderance of evidence
to the contrary.

The standard of review on appeal has

long been established in this state.

"On review,

the

Supreme Court will accord considerable deference to
judgement of trial court due to its advantaged positi9n
and will not disturb action of that court unless evidence
clearly preponderates to the cor1trary, or the trial

cour~

abuses its discretion or rnissapplies principles of law.
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 639 P.2d 177 (1981).

Neither

abuse of discretion nor a missapplication of principles
of law have been demonstrated by a clear preponderance
of evidence to warrant the imposition of a harsh forfeiture on buyer.
A.

The Law in This Jurisdiction Disfavors
The Enforcement of Forfeitures.
The lower court found that the loss to both Buyer

and Seller approximately balanced such that "The
liquidated damages provision of the contract is too
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harsh and should not be enforced by the court."

(R-134)

The language of forfeiture referred to ~tates:
"In the event the purchaser fails

to pay the

balance of said purchase price or complete said purchase
price or complete said purchase as herein provided, the
amounts paid hereon shall, at the option of the seller
be re~ained as liquidated and agreed damages."
Plaintiffs Exhibit 15-P lines 39-40.
It should be clear that the provision above cited
represents an attempt to enact an inequitable forfeiture.
It simply provides that if the purchaser causes the sale
to fail, seller is entitled to keep all monies paid,
with no allowances for amount.

In this case, the seller

attempted to use the clause to enact a $10·, 8 00. 00 penalty.
The lower courts refusal to enforce such a provision is
in line with the law in this jurisdiction which disfavors
forfeitures.

In Russell v. Park City Utah Corp.,

589 P.2d 888 (Utah 1976) the court states that forfeitures
are not enforced in the law, and forfeiture provisions
will be strictly construed against the one who seeks to
enforce them.
Sorense~

In stronger language, the Morgan v.

3 Utah 2d 428, 286 P.2d 229 (1955) court states

that forfeitures are odious to the law.

Such provision

must not be enforced in the case at bar.
B.

As a Matter of Law, Buyer is Entitled
to a Refund of Earnest Monies in Accord
with the Judgement of the Lower Court.

Finally, even if "mutual promise'' and
"unjust forfeiture" were not sufficient to allow buyer a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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refund, he is entitled to a refund as a matter of law.
Utah Code Ann. 25-5-1 (1953) provides that more than
one writing may be used to satisfy the requirements of
the statute of frauds provided some nexus between
writings is shown.
(1980).

Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369

Buyer wrote a check for $9800.00 with an

insc~iption

referring to the earnest money agreement.

The inscription provided for the signed acceptance of
Seller in the following words:

(P EX 14-P)

Earnest money paid
. . • • 1,000.00
Additional Earnest • .
. .10,000.00
Total Earnest Monies
paid subject to closing less
credit lighting fixture . . . . • • 11,000.00
Lot 10 Cottonwood Hills Sub 3. . .
200.00
$9,800.00
Utah case law provides that the requirements of
the statute of frauds may be satisfied by more than one
writing

where~

Either by express reference in signed writing
to unsigned one or by implied reference
gleaned from contents of the writing and the
circumstance surrounding the transaction, in
which case parol evidence may be used to
connect unsigned document to one that has been
signed by person to be charged. Gregerson, 617
P.2d at 370 (1980).
The court in Gregerson held that where a check was
inscribed by a purchaser in the manner stated above and
where the inscription expressly referred to the parties
with Sellers knowledge of the subject matter, that the
two writings must be read together.

-13-

Id. at 370.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The check in the present case complies with
the requirements set by the Utah Court in Gregerson
and therefore must be read together with the Earnest
Money Agreement.

The inscription provides for the

return of Buyers money by Seller on failure to close.
POINT 3
THE LOWER COURT, BY ITS DECISION, FOLLOWS THE
EQUITABLE TREND TOWARDS WIDER ENFORCEMENT OF
ORAL PROMISES.
In the case at bar it is undisputed by either
party that the written contract, the Earnest Money Agreement, was subsequently modified by oral agreement a
number of times.

This occurred despite provisions in

the agreement forbidding such modifications exept in
writing.

The conclusion that must be drawn is that

oral modification was an accepted means of contract
development and that a demand for strict performance
under the writing does not comport with the course of
dealing evidenced by the parties.
Although there are cases to the contrary,

th~

greater number of cases follow the trend that a written
executory contract for the sale of land may be reasoning
behind this trand is informatively stated in the following
statement:
There is a trend "towards wider enforcement of
oral promises." This trend was reflected as
-14-
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early as 1885 when Mr. ,Justice Stephe~ said
that the Statute of Frauds "is a relic of
times when the best evidence on such subjects
was encluded on a principle now exploded." The
Thousands of cases that have applied interpreted the Statute of Frauds show how obscure and
inadequate the statute has become.
In June of
1954 the Law Reform Act in England just about
completed the burial of the statute in that
country. The Law Revision Conunittee stated
that the statute has to a great extent been
modified by the decisions of the courts in
trying to save contracts, and that it is possible that it produced more fraud and perjuries
than it repressed.
28 Rocky Mountan L.Review
271,270 (1956).
It is clear in this case that oral rncdifications
were very consistent with the intentions of the party.
A substantial injustice would result if Plaintiff
were estopped from exercising his rights arising
from these oral agreements when there is clear
evidence that such a contract was made.
CONCLUSION
The lower court found that the operative contract,
the Earnest Money

Agreemen~was

entered into by the

parties.

That various oral changes were made by the

parties.

That defendants failed.to perform one of

those changes and consequently, at closing, Plaintiff
refused to pay the full purchase price.

Both parties

then, by oral agreement rescinded the agreement at
closing.

In addition, the court found that the seller

promised to refund the entire earnest money; a retention
of which, as liquidated dan;ages, would be too harsh
and should not be eriforccd by the court.

-15-
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The weight of authority in case law and simple
justice require that the finding, conclusion and decision
of the lower court be affirmed.
respectfully

Respondent/Buyer therefore,

requests that the decision of the lower

court be affirmed with costs and attorneys fees for this
appeal.
DATED this

JQ__

day of June, 1984.
Boyd M. Fullmer Assee.
Attorney at Law

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I

hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct

copy of this Brief of Respondents to Snow, Christensen,
and Martineau, attorneys for Appellants Defendants

10 Exchange Place 11th ~loor: Salt Lake City, Utah
This

-1.{__aay

84110

of June, 1984.
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